讲座主题：Information, Incentives, and CEO Replacement
内容:This paper provides a new explanation for CEO turnover. In an environment in which all potential CEOs are endowed with the same ability and the firm is not looking for a strategy change, I demonstrate that CEO turnover may still occur in equilibrium. Specifically, a performance-contingent CEO replacement policy changes the reward structure of the departing CEO and thereby helps reduce excessive compensation earned by a CEO who stays on the job. At the same time, hiring a new CEO to implement the project also implies that the newly hired CEO will receive a limited liability rent. The trade-off between the benefit and cost of CEO replacement may lead firms to optimally commit to a more aggressive CEO replacement policy than the one that is ex-post efficient.
讲座人简介：孟晓静，2001年毕业于中央财经大学， 2003年于北京大学光华管理学院取得会计学硕士学位， 2011年于哥伦比亚大学取得会计学博士学位。2011年加入纽约大学stern商学院，2018年晋升为副教授。美国会计协会、欧洲会计协会会员，曾多次参与国际会议，研究领域为corporate governance、debt contracting和strategic information transmission，研究成果发表于Journal of Accounting Research、Journal of Financial Economics、Review of Accounting Studies等期刊。